17 January 2006,12:34
Las soluciones a la crisis nuclear iraní y su posible desarrollo (2): China y Rusia
En este otro vamos a examinar la especial situación de China y Rusia respecto de la crisis iraní. Sus situaciones son muy distintas pero en una cosa parecen estar de acuerdo: en su dependencia mayor o menor del petróleo iraní.

En primer lugar, Rusia. Un país que tiene una de las mayores reservas de crudo del mundo pero están en Siberia y son muy difíciles de extraer. Con un potencial económico altísimo. Pero con una burocracia heredada del Estado Soviético inmensa, con un problema de seguridad interna aún mayor y con un nacionalismo exacerbado por encima de cualquier medida. Y, porcierto, con grandes subvenciones de Occidente desde la caída del comunismo. Y con un índice cada vez mayor de antisemitismo.

Y luego, China, un país comunista con más de mil millones de habitantes, con una de las culturas más ricas del mundo y con una economía en creciente expansión y, por tanto, con un altísimo consumo energético.

Así que resultado:
Russia and China made clear on Tuesday they did not favor UN sanctions to induce Iran to scale back its nuclear program, advocating more negotiations.
Their comments revealed a continuing lack of consensus among world powers over whether the UN Security Council should take up Iran's case and what action it should consider.
Germany earlier said Council members remained at odds on the Iranian nuclear issue after talks in London on Monday among the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany.
Washington and its European Union allies say EU-led talks with Iran have failed to quell suspicion that Tehran is seeking a nuclear bomb, despite its denials, and it is time the UN nuclear watchdog agency sent the case to the Security Council.
The Council could eventually decide to impose diplomatic or trade sanctions on Iran, though this would depend on the consent of its five permanent members, including Russia and China.
"The question of sanctions against Iran puts the cart before the horse. Sanctions are in no way the best, or the only, way to solve the problem," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.
He said years of international sanctions against Iraq had failed to change the behavior of ousted leader Saddam Hussein.
Moscow's $1 billion stake in building Iran's first atomic reactor gives it potential leverage over Tehran.
President Vladimir Putin hinted on Monday that Moscow was losing patience with Iran after it resumed nuclear fuel research last week, but he warned against any "abrupt, erroneous steps."
He also said after talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Moscow on Monday that Russia, European countries and the United States had "very close positions" on Iran.
Lavrov told a news briefing that Russia's offer to enrich uranium for Iran remained on the table. Tehran has sent mixed signals on the idea, which has tentative EU and U.S. support.
And the Oscar for an ambigous expression goes to:
The question of sanctions against Iran puts the cart before the horse - sanctions are in no way the best, or the only, way to solve the problem
Sergey Lavrov Russian foreign minister
De modo que a) Rusia y China hacen un comunicado conjunto en el que dicen que no quieren imponer sanciones a Irán. b) Putin dice que está perdiendo la paciencia pero que no quiere precipitarse. c) Putin afirma que Rusia, los países europeos y los EEUU -nótese que estos NO han sacado ningún comunicado conjunto- tienen posiciones muy cercanas en Irán. c) su ministro de Exteriores dice que las sanciones no son ni la única ni la mejor solución para este problema. ¿Einnnn?

Ahora vayamos a los hechos: La relación de Irán y Rusia sobre tecnología incluyendo armamento proviene de 1989, cuando Rafsanjani fue de visita a Rusia, sólo 2 semanas después de la muerte de Jomeini. En el comunicado conjunto se decía que ambos países iban a colaborar en el "uso pacífico de la energía nuclear" y que "los Soviets también querían incrementar la capacidad militar de la República Islámica". Y señala "el mutismo de Irán por la guerra de Chechenia - solamente ahora ha admitido que estaba entrenando a chechenos, pero expresamente nunca ha criticado a Rusia- todavía es más raro teniendo en cuenta el apoyo tan fuerte a los musulmanes bosnios y su irrogado papel de protector de los musulmanes en todo el mundo.
The relationship was established in a key visit to Moscow by then Majlis Speaker (now President) Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (left, in Forbes magazine) during June 19-23.1989. Although discussed long in advance, the Rafsanjani visit occurred two weeks after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution. The Iranian media noted that the joint Iranian-Soviet communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Rafsanjani visit implied that the two countries would collaborate in the "peaceful use of nuclear energy" and that the "Soviets have also agreed to bolster the military capacity of the Islamic Republic." After his meetings in Moscow, Rafsanjani visited Baku, before returning to Tehran.
Iran has even been muted in its criticism of Moscow's efforts to suppress Muslim rebels in Chechnya -only now Iran has recognised that he was trainig Chechen rebels-, which is part of Russia itself. Given Iran's strong support for the Muslims in Bosnia, and Iran's self-declared role of protector of oppressed Muslims worldwide, Iran's silence on Chechnya would be surprising were it not for Iran's fear of offending Russia.
Pero no sólo eso: un informe de Human Rights Watch de 13 de julio del 2001 señalaba a Irán, Rusia y Pakistán como los que estaban suministrando dinero y armas lo que estaba prolongando la guerra. Se señalaba como medida a tomar un embargo de armas pero se advertía que era más fácil de imponer el Frente Unido que a los talibanes por cuestiones de terreno. Cuando vamos a comprobar los "bandos" de la guerra, el informe dice:
Human Rights Watch Report on Afghanistan (date: 13/7/2001, 2 months before September 11, no Iraqi war, did anyone complaint about these generalized violations of human rights? NO, I do not remember)

The report charges that Pakistan has violated the U.N. arms embargo on the Taliban imposed in December 2000 by permitting arms to cross its border into Taliban-controlled territory
. The Taliban is the Afghan faction in power in Kabul; Pakistan has been its principal international sponsor. Official denials notwithstanding, Pakistan has provided the Taliban with military advisers and logistical support during key battles; has bankrolled the Taliban; has facilitated transshipment of arms, ammunition, and fuel through its territory; and has openly encouraged the recruitment of Pakistanis to fight for the Taliban. In addition, Saudi Arabia has provided funds to the Taliban, while private actors and some officials benefit from the smuggling that links these countries.

Supporting the coalition of opposition groups known as the United Front are Iran and Russia, with secondary roles played by Tajikistan and, at least until 1998, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Iran has provided weapons, large-scale funding, and training. Russia has played a crucial enabling role in the resupply of United Front forces by arranging for the transport of Iranian aid, as well as providing direct military assistance itself, including transport helicopters in late 2000. Military assistance to United Front forces has crossed the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border with the active collusion of the Russian government.
De modo que Paquistán había incumplido el embargo que la ONU había establecido contra los talibanes, permitiendo que las armas entraran en su territorio y, a pesar de las negaciones oficiales, Paquistán ha provisto a los talibanes con expertos militares y apoyo logístico, les ha permitido invertir en sus bancos, ha facilitado el transporte de armas, munición y combustible y ha animado abiertamente el reclutamiento por parte de los talibanes. Mientras que Arabia Saudí ha dado fondos a los talibanes junto con personas para que los introdujeran en el país.

Mientras que al Frente Unido le apoyaban Rusia e Irán, junto con papeles secundarios jugados por Tajikistan y, por lo menos hasta 1998, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Iran les ha provisto de armas, fondos a gran escala y entrenamiento. Rusia ha tenido un papel fundamental en el transporte de la ayuda iraní así como en la asistencia militar.

Human Rights Watch decía que se habían cometido "violaciones generalizadas de los derechos humanos" y que " apoyaba las sanciones contra los grupos y gobiernos que habían tomado parte en ella.

Recordemos: en julio del 2001. Dos meses antes del 11/S.

En diciembre del 2001, Rusia acordó vender a Irán misiles "defensivos" añadiendo que se habían acordado transferencias de defensa por valor de 7 millones de dólares.
The image of the Russian bear stalking Iran’s northern border was dramatically changed in late March as Moscow agreed to the sale of a “defensive” missile system to Tehran, promising up to $7 billion-worth of defense transactions to follow.
“Iran has a right to defend itself,” Russian President Vladimir Putin was quoted as saying in the centrist Iran Times (March 16). “Our regional and international well-being is largely interdependent.”
“The first thing that we must remember is that Iran is a sovereign nation that is not under any international embargo, as Iraq is,” said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov in an interview with Agence France-Presse (March 28). “And no one in their right mind would think of a missile-defense system as a weapon used for attack.”
Así que el informe de la CIA al Congreso USA (enero de 2003) mencionaba que:
  • President Vladimir Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow Russia to export nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards.
  • Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China.
  • During 2001, Russian entities remained a significant source of dual-use biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran.
Lo que traducido: a) Putin había modificado el decreto presidencial sobre exportaciones rusas de energía nuclear para que pudiera exportar material nuclear, tecnología y equipos a países que NO tenían salvoconductos por la IAEA. b) Las entidades rusas durante ese período habían continuado suministrando bienes relaciones con misiles balísticos y know-how técnico a países como Irán, India o China. c) Durante el 2001, las entidades rusas habían seguido siendo una fuente esencial de biotecnología de doble uso, químicas, tecnología de producción y equipo para Irán.

Y daba la siguiente recomendación:
The recommendation: To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities - as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them - that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted.
Reducir el flujo de ADM y de materiales relativos a misiles, tecnología y expertos para que convenzamos a las entidades exportadoras -así como a la burocracia que tiene como misión su control- que la no-proliferación es una prioridad nº 1 y que los que violen la ley serán juzgados.

Hmmm, no parece que hayan tenido mucho éxito. De hecho la técnica disuasoria ha tenido poco éxito, salvo para determinadas centrales de gas.

Y la guerra de Irak no hizo más que alejar todavía más las posturas entre Rusia y USA. Lo que no es extraño porque perdía dinero, mucho dinero. Estos eran los intereses rusos en Irak antes de la guerra (Russian interests in Irqa before the war):
  • A Soviet-era debt of $7 billion to $8 billion, generated by arms sales to Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Adjusted for inflation, that debt is worth from $10 billion to $12 billion today.
  • Lucrative contracts to develop giant oil fields and wells in Iraq, signed by Russia’s major oil company, LUKoil, and the government-owned Zarubezhneft and other companies. These contracts, worth as much as $30 billion over 20 years, include the Western Qurna oil field and wells already developed by the Russian oil companies Slavneft and Tatneft.
  • Trade in Russian goods under the U.N.–sponsored oil-for-food program, worth between $530 million and $1 billion for the six months ending in December 2001 (the volume of illegal trade between Russia and Iraq is not known).
A día de hoy, hay otras cosas que debemos tener en cuenta.

Rusia se ha negado a dejar de suministrar combustible nuclear a Irán a la planta de Bushehr, ha construido un satélite para Irán (con capacidad de comunicación telefónica y transmisión de datos principalmente) y continúa ayudándole en la construcción de sus plantas nucleares (en la foto, Bushehr, tomada desde satélite en construcción aún). Incluso, si a alguien le interesa tienen un sistema conjunto de detección y neutralización de ¡¡¡OVNIS!!! (claro que lo dice Pravda...).

Algunos se preguntan si Rusia ha cambiado porque las palabras de su ministro de Exteriores no son tan claras sobre Irán. Y dice:
Russia stands to earn billions of the dollars over the long-term out-fitting Iran with peaceful nuclear technology. Second, what Russian can do for Iran -- at an attractive profit -- it can do for other countries in the world seeking to develop the same technologies. Third, engagement of Iran maintains Russia position as a powerbroker in the region. Russia is keen to have good relations with all players in the Greater Middle East -- the U.S. can't say the same. Additionally, the most important and not so obvious reason, Russia is acting upon its "multilateralism" or "multipolarism" approach to foreign policy. (...)This means that Russia will support Iran's nuclear program or Syria against Western pressure as long as the political costs end as a net gain.
O sea: Rusia gana dinero, Rusia puede actuar en Irán probando tecnologías y así hacer ver a otros posibles interesados el resultado que éstas dan, Rusia se mantiene como un poder en la región y Rusia está llevando a cabo la teoría del multilateralismo o multipolarismo. Eso sí, mientras que obtenga una ganancia neta.

La pregunta es: ¿hasta cuándo esperaremos a que cada uno gane mientras el mundo en general pierde? Así las cosas: Israel pide a Rusia que apruebe sanciones económicas contra Irán.
So the real big question is: how much are we going to wait for Russia to get rich selling this type of goods to Iran? And, logically, Israel tries to convince Russia to approve sanctions against Iran.
Y para terminar:
New systems being offered for sale by Moscow include S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, of the kind WorldNetDaily reported were being sold by Russia to China.
Also, Russia is planning to sell Iran Mi-17 helicopter gunships and upgraded Su-25 fighter aircraft.
Yesterday, the Washington Times confirmed earlier U.S. intelligence reports that Moscow had moved an undisclosed number of tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, a base located in the Baltics, despite earlier pledges to keep the Baltics "nuclear-free."
And, the Times said Russia strategic and conventional air, sea and land forces were currently engaged in what U.S. officials describe as the largest war game exercises "we've seen in a long time."
En cuanto a China, ésta ha incrementado sus relaciones con Rusia en los últimos años de manera expectacular:
In mid-December, Moscow was set to transfer the first 10 Su-30MKK fighter aircraft to China, purchased by Beijing last year, with an additional 40 aircraft set for delivery over the next two to three years. Also, the forthcoming delivery of 28 advanced Su-27 fighters will bring China's overall aircraft purchases from Russia to 118, the American Foreign Policy Council said.
"In addition, an aircraft factory in Shenyang, China -- under license with Russia -- will manufacture an additional 200 Su-27 jet fighters during the next 15 years," said the group. (READ ALL)
Podemos decir que es Rusia la que mantiene armada a China:
While China does not have the most modern weaponry or military technologies, the reality is that it has most of what it needs and is not having great difficulties in procuring from other countries, outside the European Union and the United States, what it does need.(...) Where does China turn when it shops for military weapons? In a word, Russia. According to the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), China constitutes the largest single importer of post-Soviet Russian arms and military equipment, with purchases ranging between 30% and 50% of Russia's entire annual deliveries.
Without those arms exports to China, Russia would lack the funds to modernize its own military. In fact, in the past Russia has prohibited the export of certain of its military aircraft, or production licenses, to China only to revoke the ban later on.
Rosoboronexport, the sole state intermediary agency for Russia's military arms sales and exports, estimated that sales will total US$4.1 billion this year, down from $5.1 billion in 2003. Aircraft and ships account for over half of the exports.
China purchased eight missile systems this summer from Russia and has already received 24 Su-30MKK fighters. (READ ALL)
El año 2003 se decía:
From 1998 to 2003, imports of crude oil from the Middle East account for 50.9 percent in China's total imports. The import volume from Iran took up 13.6 percent, secondly only to that from Saudi Arabia, 16.7 percent. The annual growth rate of imports from Iran stood at 16.5 percent, also ranking the second. Analysts point out that once the memorandum of understanding signed by China and Iran on the Yadavaran Oilfield Development Project is implemented, China is likely to overtake Japan and European countries in the area of international oil and gas development in Iran, becoming one of the largest investors in Iran's oil and gas field.
The present situation and development prospects of oil trade between China and Iran are not only crucial to the rapid development of the Chinese economy in recent years, they will play an irreplaceable role for China as it strives to fulfill the goal of doubling its GNP in the next ten years.
La situación actual y los proyectos de desarrollo del mercado del petróleo entre China e Irán no son sólo cruciales para la economía china de los últimos años si no que jugarán un papal irremplazable para China mientras intenta cumplir con el objetivo de doblar su PIB en los próximos 10 años. Y otra vez sale a tenor de esta cuestión: SUDÁN.
Today's American and Western attention for the Darfur question has much to do with Khartoum's new commercial and political ties with Iran and -- especially -- China. Beijing's attempt to gain influence in Africa is in fact one of our age's geopolitical novelties. Its main goal is to acquire African oil and gas at favorable conditions, in regions where Western oil majors must still compete for total control. Beijing's new African policy has been focused on Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. It must be said, for the sake of accuracy, that Sino-Sudanese relations are not entirely new, for the arms trade between the two countries has been in place since the late sixties.
Control over oil reserves is at the top of China's wishes -- and Sudanese diffidence for the U.S. seems to be a good set-up for Chinese penetration as a powerbroker. In 2003, China's National Petroleum Corp. planned to invest one billion dollars to create Sudan's largest oil refinery. Moreover, as recent declarations from Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed Al-Jazz confirmed, a newly-discovered oil field expected to produce 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil is located in the Darfur region. This latter is also the way to Chad, a country well-known for its natural gas reserves.
At a time of growing strategic partnership between U.S. geopolitical adversaries such as Iran and China, Sudan's importance is understandable in light of its energy assets and strategic position to securitize the "Greater Middle East."
Pues sí, habeis leído bien: en 2003 la Corporación Nacional de Petróleo Chino planeó invertir 1 billón de dólares para crear la refinería más grande de petróleo de Sudán. Además, como recientes declaraciones (el artículo es de Junio de 2005) del Ministro sudanés de la Energía y las Minas Awad Ahmed Al-Jazz han confirmado, una bolsa de petróleo podría producir 500.000 BARRILES DIARIOS DE PETRÓLEO LOCALIZADOS EN .... DARFUR.... Así, que la importancia de Sudán sólo se entiende a la luz de la cuestión energética y de la posición estratégica para asegurar EL GRAN ORIENTE MEDIO.

¿Dónde están que no oigo a los de "No más sangre por petróleo"? Noooo, que Sudán es islámico y China es comunista. Ajá.


Conclusión: algunos lo han llamado el eje China-Irán Rusia:
The China-Iran-Russia axis has been dubbed "that other axis" by Asia Times' Jephraim P. Gundzik, who wrote June 9, 2005, that "Beijing's increasingly close ties with Moscow and Tehran will thwart Washington's foreign policy goal of expanding US security footholds in the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia. However, the primacy of economic stability will most likely prevent a proxy-style military confrontation, in Iran or North Korea, between China and the US."
Initially, Moscow supported Washington's 'war on terrorism'. However, the US invasion of Iraq changed this support into resistance, and later into active efforts to counterbalance the US. In the past two years both Washington and Moscow have sought to strengthen their influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. ... More significantly, Moscow is working diligently to strengthen its ties with Iran, Syria and China - countries that Washington considers to be adversaries," Gundzik wrote in March 2005.
Additionally, since the "beginning of the war in Iraq," he said, "Beijing has worked feverishly ... in an apparent effort to prevent US military action against the remaining 'axis of evil' members, Iran and North Korea. In addition to recent massive energy deals with Teheran, which place Iran in China's security web, both Beijing and Moscow have accelerated the transfer of missile technology to Teheran, while selling the Islamic republic increasingly sophisticated military equipment.
"Armed with a vast array of anti-ship and long-range missiles, Iran can target US troop positions throughout the Middle East and strike US Navy ships. Iran can also use its weapons to blockade the Straits of Hormuz through which one-third of the world's traded oil is shipped. With the help of Beijing and Moscow, Teheran is becoming an increasingly unappealing military target for the US.
Both North Korea and Iran are following a course of action that is putting them directly at odds with U.S. interests. North Korea declared that it possesses nuclear weapons and that it will continue to build up its nuclear arsenal unless it receives certain concessions from the United States, and Iran has firmly expressed its desire to control the nuclear fuel cycle, raising concerns that it plans on developing covertly its own nuclear weapons," Erich Marquadt wrote in May 2005.
"It will be important for the United States, which benefits tremendously -- strategically and economically -- from its immense influence in East Asia, to prevent China from gaining hegemony over the area. In order to stunt this possibility, Washington will need to devise methods and strategies to meet increased Chinese regional influence," Marquardt commented in July 2004.
 
posted by Spanish Eowyn
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